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discrimination
by Yutaka Aral
The Strasbourg-based Court and Commission of Human Rights have both 
attached great importance to the prohibition of discrimination. In this 
article, Yutaka Arai examines their approach, which leaves national 
authorities with only the narrowest margin of appreciation on the issue.
The importance of the prohibition of discrimination is witnessed by the variety of human rights treaties which have enunciated this principle as one of the fundamental 
aspects of human dignity. The issue of non-discrimination has 
attracted careful attention from the Strasbourg organs (the 
European Court and Commission of Human Rights). It is one of 
the areas where the Strasbourg organs have left the narrowest 
margin of appreciation to national authorities.
The list of grounds of discrimination prohibited under art. 14 
is not exhaustive. According to art. 14, discrimination is 
prohibited 'on any grounds such as ...', and at the end of the list, 
'other status' is added (K J Partsch, 'Discrimination', in The 
European System for the Protection of Human Rights, ed. R St J 
Macdonald, F Matscher and H Pet/old (1993), p. 575).
Unlike art. 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), which prohibits discrimination in all 
the areas which states regulate, the reach of prohibition under 
art. 14 of the European Convention is limited to those 
substantive rights embodied in the Convention. In that sense, the 
prohibition of discrimination is complementary and ancillary. 
(Article. 2 (1) of the ICCPR, art. 2 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights as well as art. 2 (f) of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child are also of complementary nature. These 
provisions must be contrasted to art. 26 of the ICCPR, which 
clearly lays down an independent 'equality' right. In this respect, 
see A F Bayefsky, The Principle of Equality or Non-discrimination in 
International Law (1990) 11 HRLJ 3-4 and the footnotes 
attached.) However, the complementary character of art. 14 
must be qualified in two respects. First, a breach of art. 14 can 
be found even where no violation of a substantive right exists. In 
the case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use oj Languages 
in Education in Belgium (the ''Belgian Linguistic' case (judgment of 
23 July 1968, Series A6, European Court of Human Rights 
(hereinafter A6); (1979-80) 1 EHRR 252), the court 
emphasised that:
'... a measure which in itself is in conformity with the requirements 
of the Article enshrining the right of freedom in question may however 
infringe this Article when read in conjunction with Article 14 for the 
reason that it is oj a discriminatory' nature', (s. IB, para. 9)
Secondly, as a result, issues of discrimination arise even in 
areas where states are not obliged to provide specific protection. 
In other words, if states choose to create a certain right or 
benefit, this measure must be implemented in a non-
discriminatory manner. The court observed as follows:
'Thus, persons subject to the jurisdiction of a Contracting State 
cannot draw from Article 2 of the Protocol the right to obtain from the 
public authorities the creation of a particular kind oj educational 
establishment; nevertheless, a State which had set up such an 
establishment could not, in laying down entrance requirements, take 
discriminatory measures within the meaning of Article 14.
'To recall ajurther example . . . Article 6 of the Convention does not 
compel States to institute a system of appeal courts. A State which does 
set up such courts consequently goes beyond its obligations under Article 
6. However it would violate that Article, read in conjunction with Article 
14, were it to debar certain persons from these remedies without a 
legitimate reason while making them available to others in respect of the 
same type of actions.'
THE 'AMBIT' TEST
Since art. f4 is complementary in nature, it is first necessary 
to consider whether an alleged breach of a right falls within the 
ambit of the convention. As noted, a right in relation to which 
art. 14 is invoked, does not need to be the one a state is obliged 
to guarantee under the Convention (Belgian Linguistic case, at s. I 
B, para. 9), but it must at least be related to a substantive right 
under the Convention. In X v Netherlands 5763/72, decision of 18 
December 1973, 16 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human 
Plights (hereinafter Ybk) 274, the Commission noted as follows:
'Although it is not necessary first to establish the existence of a 
violation of any of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention, 
the allegations under Article 14 must be related to such rights and 
freedoms' (at 296, emphasis added).
The question is then how close a relation is required between 
an art. 14 claim and a protected right. Issues of 'ambit' are 
relevant to assessing the strictness of the Commission's review at 
the admissibility level.
On this matter, it is however difficult to identify any coherent 
policy behind the Commission's decision-making. While the 
Commission has frequently used the language of 'sufficient 
relation' in assessing whether an issue of discrimination arises in 
conjunction with a substantive right, it is difficult to regard this 
as an objectively identifiable test. In a Dutch case concerning 
alleged sex discrimination (Family K and W v Netherlands 
1 1278/84, decision of 1 July 1985, 43 Decisions and Reports of the 
European Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter DR) 216), the 
Commission considered that the right to acquire a particular
nationality was
'... neither covered by, nor sufficiently related to either Article 14 or 
other substantive provisions of the Convention' (at 220).
On the other hand, in a German case concerning alleged 
discrimination against male homosexuals (X v Germany 5935/72,
o v >
decision of 30 September 1975, 19 Ybk 276), the Commission 
simply assumed that art. 14 was implicated, and decided to 
examine the case under art. 14 read together with art. 8. It 
emphasised that:
'... it is sufficient that the "subject matter"Jails within the scope oj 
the article in question' (at 286).
In this case, the Commission considered that the age of 
consent for legal male homosexual acts, which was fixed higher
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than that for heterosexual and lesbian acts, fell within the 
reasonable margin. The Commission observed as follows:
Tt can therefore be admitted that the age alone which homosexual 
relationships are no longer subject to the criminal law may be fixed 
within a reasonable margin and vary depending on the attitude oj 
society. In the instant case it would not seem that the age limit of 1 8- 
21 although relatively high and since lowered can be considered as 
going beyond this reasonable margin.'
Moreover, in cases concerning social security', the Commission 
has consistently held that social benefits cannot be considered 
'possessions' within the meaning of art. 1 of the First Protocol. 
Thus rights to receive a pension under the national insurance 
scheme are not guaranteed by the Convention (X v Netherlands 
4130/69, decision of 20 July 197 1, 38 Collection of Decisions of the 
European Commission oj Human Rights (hereinafter CD) 9, at 13). 
Nevertheless, the tendency is readily to find a 'sufficient 
relation', and to carry out a separate evaluation of discrimination 
under art. 14 in social security cases. For example, in a Dutch 
case where the applicant complained of the reduction of her 
pension benefit in view of her additional receipt of a Norwegian 
pension, the Commission found that her allegations of 
discrimination were 'related' to the right to peaceful enjoyment 
of possessions within the meaning of art. 1 of the First Protocol, 
and decided to examine the merits under art. 14 in conjunction 
with that provision (X v Netherlands 5763/72, decision of 18 
December 1973, 16 Ybk 274, at 296).
ASSESSING DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENTS
Contrary to the implication of the French text, ''sans distinction 
aucune', art. 14 does not prohibit all kinds of distinction or 
differential treatment (P Van Dijk and G J H Van Hoof, Theory 
and Practice oj the European Convention on Human Plights, 2nd ed. 
(1990), p. 539, Kluwenter, Deventer). States are confronted 
with situations which inevitably or inherently involve 
differentiation. They are thus obliged to take different legal 
measures which respond in one way or another to factual 
inequalities. For example, progressive income tax may be 
justified to achieve equitable distribution of wealth in a capitalist 
society, which inevitably entails economic disparity. States are 
allowed a certain margin of appreciation in evaluating whether 
the conditions on which and the manner in which a certain 
measure is set up and implemented are discriminatory.
If not all differences in treatment amount to 'discrimination' 
within the meaning of art. 14, what are the criteria for 
distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate differences in 
treatment? The first attempt to answer this question came in the 
Belgian Linguistic case, which concerned a difference in treatment
between Flemish and French speakers in relation, inter alia, to 
the language of instruction at school. The court implicitly 
recognised the national margin of appreciation, noting that its 
review remained subsidiary to the national authorities' 
evaluation of fundamental rights:
'... the principle oj equality ojtreatment is violated ij the distinction 
has no objective and reasonable justification. The existence of such a 
justification must be assessed in relation to the aim and effects of the 
measure under consideration, regard being had to the principles which 
normally prevail in democratic societies. A difference of treatment in the 
exercise of a right laid down in the Convention must not only pursue a 
legitimate aim: Article 14 is likewise violated when it is clearly 
established that there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.
In attempting to find out in a given case, whether or not there has 
been an arbitrary distinction, the Court cannot disregard those legal and 
factual features which characterise the life oj the society in the State 
which, as a Contracting party, has to answerfor the measure in dispute. 
In so doing it cannot assume the role of the competent national 
authorities, for it would thereby lose sight of the subsidiary nature of the 
international machinery of collective enforcement established by the 
Convention. The national authorities remain free to choose the measure 
which they consider appropriate in those matters which are governed by 
the Convention. Review by the Court concerns only the conformity of 
these measures with the requirements oj the Convention' (para. 10).
To summarise, a difference in treatment constitutes 
discrimination:
(a) unless it has a legitimate aim and;
(b) unless there exists a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim pursued.
Apart from these criteria, the Strasbourg organs have 
consistently emphasised that art. 14 safeguards individuals, or 
groups of individuals, 'placed in comparable situations' (National 
Union of Belgian Police case, judgment of 27 October 1975, A19, 
para. 44) or 'placed in analogous situations', (Van der Mussele v 
Belgium, judgment of 23 November 1983, A70, para. 46; Lithgow 
&0rs v UK, judgment of 8 July 1986, A102, para. 177) from 
discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights embodied in the 
Convention. This means that an individual or a group claiming a 
violation of art. 14 must show that the situations, as regards 
which difference in treatment exists, are comparable or 
analogous. This requirement can be illustrated by the Van der 
A4ussele case, where a pupil avocat was required to defend an 
accused without receiving remuneration or reimbursement of 
expenses. The applicant complained, of a violation of art. 14 
taken together with art. 4, alleging that only the pupil avocats are 
subject to a 'forced or compulsory labour' as compared with 
other professions. The court found no violation of these 
provisions, considering that between the Bar and other 
professions cited by the applicant, there existed 'fundamental 
differences' (para. 46).
Legitimate aim
States rarely attempt to justify difference in treatment on an 
arbitrary ground. The national authorities are quite aware that 
any difference in treatment requires rationalisation. As a result, 
as in the case with other provisions, very rarely has the legitimacy 
of the aims pursued been denied under art. 14. (However, see 
Darby v Sweden, judgment of 23 October 1990, A187, in which 
the court found that the refusal to exempt a non-registered 
foreign worker, as opposed to a registered foreign worker, from
a church tax did not pursue a legitimate aim). 
Proportionality
Throughout the case-law of various provisions under the 
Convention, the Strasbourg organs have consistently required a 
proportionate balance to be established between the means 
employed and the aim pursued. Because of the importance of 
the principle of non-discrimination, they have stressed that close 
regard should be had to the 'effects' of the interference (Belgian 
Linguistic case, para. 10). In the case of difference in treatment, 
it must be ascertained whether the:
'... disadvantage suffered by the applicant is excessive in relation to 
the legitimate aim pursued.' (National Union of Belgian Police case, 
para. 49)
The assessment of proportionality is influenced by the variety 
of factors involved. For example, considerations of national 
security and emergency may lead to a relaxed evaluation of 
proportionality: in these areas, the 'effects' of interference on 
individuals tend to be neglected (see, for instance, Ireland v UK, 
judgment of 18 January 1978, A25, para. 230). In addition, the 
types of discrimination are an important factor in determining 
the vigour with which proportionality is assessed. Difference in 
treatment on the ground of race, sex or illegitimacy will invite 
the most rigorous evaluation of proportionality. On the other 
hand, with respect to other grounds of difference in treatment, 
e.g., the status of trade unions, the Strasbourg organs' evaluation 
of proportionality may be criticised as cursory. Here the 
evaluation of proportionality is substituted by a reference to the 
national margin of appreciation. For instance, in the Swedish 
Engine Drivers Union case, judgment of 6 February 1976, A20, the 
finding that national power of appreciation was not overstepped 
led the court to conclude that the proportionality principle was 
met (para. 47 48; see also Schmidt and Dahlstrom, judgment of 
6 February 1976, A21, para. 40 41.) The better view is to treat 
the proportionality principle as a yardstick rather than as the 
reasoning for assessing whether national authorities have 
exceeded their margin of appreciation.
THE NATIONAL MARGIN OF 
APPRECIATION
The Strasbourg organs have allowed a 'margin of appreciation' 
to the national authorities:
'... in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise 
similar situations justify a different treatment in law ... The scope of 
the margin of appreciation will vary according to the circumstances, the 
subject-matter and its background (Rasmussen v Denmark, judgment 
of 28 November 1984, A87, para. 40; Abdulaziz S^Ors v UK, 
judgment of 28 May 1985, A94, para. 72 and 78; Lithgow &_ 
Ors v UK, judgment of 8 July 1986, A102, para. 177; Inze v 
Austria, judgment of 28 October 1987, A126, para. 41; 
Karlheinz Schmidt v Germany, Commission's Report of 14 January 
1993, A291-B, para. 43)
Another factor that the court has recognised as 'relevant' to 
the variation of the national margin is:
'... the existence or non-existence of common ground between the 
laws of the Contracting States'. (Rasmussen v Denmark, para. 40)
But despite the national margin of appreciation, the 
Strasbourg organs have repeatedly mentioned that the national 
decisions must be subject to the review of the Commission and 
Court (Abdulaziz S^Ors v UK, para. 72).
ASSESSING THE POLICY OF REVIEW
The survey of the case-law reveals the application of a 'dual 
standard'. Where difference in treatment is based on the ground 
of race, sex or illegitimacy, the Strasbourg organs assume a prima 
facie need for a separate examination of art. 14 and apply a strict 
standard of proportionality. On the other hand, where 
discrimination is alleged on other grounds, the tendency is to be 
satisfied with the finding of a breach of a substantive right alone.o o
The standard of proportionality may also be lowered.
In relation to differences in treatment on the ground of sex, 
the Strasbourg organs have consistently applied a heightened 
standard of proportionality. In the Abdulaziz case, sex 
discrimination was alleged on the ground that the UK authorities 
allowed a resident foreign husband to be joined by his foreign 
wife or fiance while refusing the same treatment to a resident 
foreign wife. The respondent state strongly pleaded for the 
national margin of appreciation in the area of immigration policy 
(para. 75). While recognising 'a certain margin of appreciation' 
in assessing difference in treatment (para. 78), the court stressed 
the importance of gender equality and required 'very weighty 
reasons' justifying a difference in treatment solely on the ground 
of sex. Since no such strong rationalisation was adduced by the 
respondent state, a violation of art. 14 was found in conjunction 
with art. 8.
Stringent standards
The policy of applying a stringent standard of examination is 
consistently followed in subsequent cases involving differences on 
the ground of sex. In Schuler-Zgraggen v Switzerland, judgment of 
24 June 1993, A263, para. 67, a Swiss woman complained that a 
pension granted on the basis of invalidity was cancelled after she 
gave birth to a child. The decision to withdraw her pension was 
based solely on the assumption that women gave up work when 
they gave birth to a child. Again, the standards of 'reasonable and 
objective justification' required of the national authorities was 
heightened, as evidenced by the requirement that the national 
authorities must put forward 'very weighty reasons' justifying 
differences on the ground of sex. Since no such reasons existed, 
there was a breach of art. 14 taken together with art. 6(1).
The same heightened scrutiny was seen in Burghartz v 
Switzerland, judgment of 22 February 1994, A280-B, where the 
court found discrimination under art. 14 read together with 
art. 8 in relation to the refusal of the Swiss authorities to allow a 
man to place his surname before his wife's, which was taken as 
their joint family name. Under the then Swiss Civil Code such a 
possibility was open only to women. The court apparently 
modified the policy of reticence that the commission had 
previously adopted and took an affirmative step in respect of the 
choice of names and gender equality. (See, for instance, 
Hagmann-Hilsler v Switzerland 8042/77, decision of 15 December 
1977, 12 DR 202 (as regards the use of the maiden name for the 
purpose of standing in a parliamentary election); and X v 
Netherlands 9250/81, decision of 3 May 1983, 32 DR 175 (with 
respect to the requirement that the registration of married 
women on the electoral list refer to their husbands' names).)
Reverse sex discrimination
Stringent scrutiny has also been seen in two recent cases 
involving reverse sex discrimination. Thus the Strasbourg organs 
have found that the national authorities overstepped the margin 
of appreciation in relation to the exemption of women from 
compulsory service for a fire brigade (Karlheinz Schmidt v
Germany, judgment of 18 July 1994, A291-B) or of unmarried 
childless women over a certain ape from the contribution to the
o
child benefit scheme (Van Raalte v Netherlands, judgment of 
21 February 1997, (1997) 24 EHRR 503). In these cases, while 
expressly recognising the 'margin of appreciation', the 
Strasbourg organs have rejected the distinction based on a 
general assumption of physical fitness or biological procreation. 
It remains to be seen whether such an assertive policy of review 
may be consistently applied in the future case-law.
Illegitimacy
On issues of illegitimacy as well, since the leading case of 
Marckx. v Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, A31, the Strasbourg 
organs have consistently rejected pleas for the national margin of 
appreciation. (See also, Inze v Austria, judgment of 28 October 
1987, A126; and Vermeire v Belgium, judgment of 29 November 
1991, A214-C.) In the Marckx case, while considering the 
support and encouragement of the traditional family as 
legitimate (para. 40), the court repudiated the justification for 
placing 'illegitimate' mothers at a disadvantaged position in 
comparison to legitimate mothers with respect to the right to 
establish the affiliation of their children. No convincing evidence 
was adduced which would prove why 'illegitimate' mothers were 
more prone to abandon their children (para. 38 39).
Race
Another 'suspect category', of course, is any distinction on the 
ground of race. East African Asians v UK, (1970) 13 Ybk 928, at 
994; Commission's Report of 14 December 1973, 78-ADR5, 
involved the immigration legislation imposing the so-called 
'ancestral' or 'place of birth' rule on the immigrants. Under the 
legislation at issue, a person had a right to enter the UK only if 
he or one of his parents or grandparents had been born in the 
UK. This was alleged to be discriminatory on the ground that 
those affected by the relevant legislation were mostly non-white 
immigrants. The issue of alleged discrimination in relation to the 
right of entry of the nationals was rejected in that the UK had 
not ratified the Fourth Protocol (as of 2 April 1998, the UK has 
not ratified the Fourth Protocol; see http://www.coe.fr/tablconv 
/46t.htm), which guarantees the right to enter one's own state. 
Article 14 applies only in cases where discrimination is 
connected to the enjoyment of any right or freedom provided for 
in the Convention or its Protocols. Nonetheless, the 
Commission declared the complaint admissible, holding that:
... quite apart from any consideration of Article 14, discrimination 
based on race could, in certain circumstances, of itself amount to 
degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention' 
(para. 188-95).
To describe the mere refusal of entry on the ground of race as 
amounting to 'degrading treatment' as proscribed by art. 3 
shows the vigour with which racial differences will be treated by 
the Strasbourg organs. 
Nationality
Similarly, difference in treatment based on the ground of 
nationality may also call for strict scrutiny in some areas. The 
Strasbourg organs have required the national authorities to 
adduce 'very weighty reasons' which would justify such a 
differential treatment (Gaygusuz v Austria, judgment of 16 
September 1996, (1997) EHRR 364, para. 42). Such a 
distinction is likely to be held as arbitrary, having no 'objective 
and reasonable justification'. Thus in the Gaygusuz case, both the 
Commission and court found a violation of art. 14 taken
together with art. 1 of the First Protocol as regards the refusal to 
offer a social welfare benefit to a legal worker of Turkish 
nationality, who contributed to the insurance scheme on the 
same basis as Austrian nationals.
In the foregoing areas, in particular, with respect to distinction 
on the ground of race, sex and illegitimacy, the Strasbourg organs 
have adopted an approach similar to the concept of 'suspect 
classifications' developed in the jurisprudence of the US 
Supreme Court. (See D J Harris, M O'Boyle and C Warbrick, 
Law cf the European Convention on Human Rights (1995), p. 481, 
Butterworths, London). As to the 'suspicious classification' in 
the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court, see, in particular, J 
H Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review ( 1980), p. 
145 170, Harvard Univ Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts) In 
addition, the phrases used in the relevant passages by the 
Convention organs are reminiscent of those rights provided in 
art. 8 11, which, as 'fundamental rights in a democratic society', 
call for strict scrutiny.
As for art. 8, see, in particular, X St^Anor v Netherlands, judgment 
of 26 March 1985, A91, para. 27. With respect to art. 9, see, for 
example, Kokkinakis v Greece, judgment of 25 May 1993, A260, 
para. 31; and Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria, judgment of 20 
September 1994, A295-A, para. 47. Note also that in a number 
of cases, the Strasbourg organs have held that freedom of7 o o
expression constitutes one of the 'essential foundations' of a 
democratic society and that any restriction on this right is 
subject to the most stringent scrutiny, however inflammatory 
and objectionable it may be according to the prevailing view of 
the society: see, inter alia, Handyside v UK, judgment of 7 
December 1976, A24, para. 49; Muller &^ Ors v Switzerland, 
judgment of 24 May 1988, A133, para. 36 and 43; Scherer v 
Switzerland, judgment of 25 March 1994 (struck out of the list), 
A287, Commission's Report of 14 January 1993, para. 224.
Under the European Convention, the classifications based on 
race, sex or illegitimacy are decidedly 'suspect'. Whether these 
so-called 'suspect categories' may be extended is difficult to 
predict. The Strasbourg organs have not treated other bases of 
discrimination with the same rigour as they have these grounds.
A difficult question is how to identify the 'suspect categories'. 
The existence of a European consensus may be a clue. In this 
respect, an evolving standard among the contracting states must
r ' o o o
be taken into account. For instance, when the Convention was 
first drafted in 1950, differential treatment between legitimate 
and illegitimate children was prevalent among the member states 
especially in relation to inheritance rights. Now, however, the 
growing tendency in Western Europe is to remove such 
discriminatory barriers against children born out of wedlock.
AIREY FORMULA
Although the Convention organs recognise that an issue of 
discrimination arises under art. 14, they may refrain from 
carrying out a separate examination under this provision in view 
of a finding of a breach of a substantive right. On the other hand, 
to engage in a separate examination of art. 14 claims shows the 
Strasbourg organs' strict policy of review and their determination 
not to readily concede to states a margin of appreciation.
Whether an associated inquiry into the question of art. 14 is 
needed must be distinguished from the issue of an 'ambit' test 
raised at the admissibility stage, i.e., whether an art. 14 
complaint falls within the ambit of a protected right. No issue of 
art. 14 mav be addressed to the Court if the Commission has
already declared the complaint relating to art. 14 inadmissible.
In Airey v Ireland, judgment of 9 October 1979, A32, the Court 
summarised the standard rule concerning the question of 
whether a separate examination is necessary under art. 14 in 
conjunction with a substantive provision:
'If the Court Joes not find a separate breach of one of those art.s that 
has been invoked both on its own and together with art. 14, it must 
also examine the case under the latter art.. On the other hand, such an 
examination is not generally required when the Court finds a violation of 
the former art. taken alone. The position is othenvisc if a clear 
inequality of treatment in the enjoyment of the right in question is a 
fundamental aspect of the case ...' (para. 30).
THE 'EVOLUTIVE' INTERPRETATION
The 'evolutive' interpretation was affirmed in Tyrer v UK, judgment 
of 25 April 1978, A26, in which the use of judicial corporal 
punishment against a juvenile was complained of under art. 3. The 
court emphasised that:
'. . . the Convention is a living instrument which ... must be interpreted in 
the light of present-day conditions. In the case now before it the Court cannot 
but be influenced by the developments and commonly accepted standards in 
the penal policy of the member States of the Council of Europe in this field.' 
(para. 31)
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Thus a separate examination of the art. 14 point is necessary 
where 'a clear inequality of treatment' relates to 'a fundamental 
aspect of the case'.
However, the application of the ''Airey formula' is hardly 
consistent. The court has not given any explanation why in some 
cases it abstains from judicial review under art. 14 while in other 
cases it engages in a separate examination. For instance, in the 
Burghartz case, discrimination was alleged as regards the refusal 
of Swiss authorities to allow the applicants to place a husband's 
surname in front of his wife's, which was adopted as their family 
name, and the Court decided to examine the case directly under 
art. 14 by reason of'the nature of the complaints' (para. 21). In 
contrast to other cases, in this case, the Court did not find it 
necessary to make a separate examination under art. 8 (para. 
30). As pointed out by the leading authors, it is not any principle 
derived from the rule of law but merely 'a policy of judicial 
abstention' which has inclined the Strasbourg bodies to avoid 
any associated examination of art. 14 (Harris, O'Boyle and 
Warbrick, p. 469).
The ''Airey formula' may be more aptly explained by the 
application of the 'dual standard'. Where differences in 
treatment arc based on the ground of race, sex (Abdulaziz St^Ors v 
UK; and Schuler-Zgraggen v Switzerland), and illegitimacy7 (Alarckx v 
Belgium; Inze v Austria; and Vermeire v Belgium), the Strasbourg 
organs assume a prima facie need for a separate examination of 
art. 14 and engage in an assertive policy of review. On the other 
hand, their passive policy of review has been particularly 
conspicuous in relation to the cases of differential treatment of 
homosexuals. For instance, in Dudgeon v UK, A45, the Court was 
asked to decide among other things whether the fact that, in 
contrast to heterosexual and lesbian relationships, only male 
homosexual activities, even in private between consenting adults, 
were subject to criminal sanctions, amounted to discrimination. 
The court did not find it necessary to decide on this matter in 
view of the finding of a separate breach of art. 8, noting that:
'... there is no call to rule on the merits of a particular issue which is 
part oj and absorbed by a wider issue',
and hence that there was 'no useful legal purpose' in deciding 
this question (para. 69); however see the dissenting opinion of 
Judge Matscher that the issue of discrimination must be decided 
by the court. He examined the merits under art. 14 together 
with art. 8, and found no violation of these provisions 
(p. 35 37). The claim of discrimination was also not dealt with 
before the Commission and court, in virtually the same 
circumstances, in the later Norris case (Norris v Ireland, judgment 
of 26 October 1988 and Commission's Report of 12 March 
1987, A142).
EVALUATION OF PROPORTIONALITY
The dual standard is well-illustrated in the evaluation of 
proportionality as well. Where difference of treatment is based 
on the ground of race, sex or illegitimacy, the Strasbourg organs 
have carried out a close scrutiny of the merits, taking into 
account the effects of the measure. In such areas, they may rely 
on 'evolutive' interpretation and shift the burden of proof to the 
national authorities.
Evolutive interpretation
The rigorous assessment of proportionality may be evidenced 
by reliance on the so-called 'evolutive' interpretation. The 
Strasbourg organs have consistently recognised that the 
Convention must be interpreted in the light of social 
developments and attitudes. Closely related to this method is the 
so-called comparative method (see W J Ganshof van der 
Meersch Reliance, in the Case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights, on the Domestic Law of the States (1980) 1 HRLJ 13; Harris, 
O'Boyle and Warbrick, p. 9 11; E Kastanas Unite et Diversite: 
notions autonomes et marge d'appreciation des Etats dans la 
jurisprudence de la Com europeenne des droits de 1'homme (1996), 
p. 186-224, 306-329, Bruylant, Brussels; F Matscher, 
'Methods of Interpretation of the Convention', in The European 
System for the Protection of Human Rights, ed R St J Macdonald, F 
Matscher and H Petzold, (1993), p. 74-5 and the footnotes 
therein).
The Strasbourg organs have often taken into account the law
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and practice of other member states as relevant factors in the 
evaluation of proportionality7. These affirmative methods of 
interpretation have been seen where differences in treatment are 
based on the ground of sex or illegitimacy. Recognising the need 
for evolutive interpretation, the Strasbourg organs have found 
discrimination, for example with respect to an obligation 
imposed solely on men to serve in the fire brigade or pay a 
financial contribution in lieu. ( In Karlheinz Schmidt v Germany, the 
Commission expressly relied on the'evolutive' interpretation:
'... the Convention is a living instrument to be interpreted in the 
light of current circumstances. It follows that the need for appropriate 
legal measures should be kept under review ... The Government base 
their case on traditional attitudes prevalent in one particular region. But 
it is not impossible for a distinction which might have been thought 
legitimate when first drawn to lose its reason for existence, and thus its 
justification, in the course of time'. (Commission's Report of 14 January 
1993, A291-B, para. 45)
The court also found a breach of art. 14 read together with 
art. 4(3)(d), but without any reference to the 'evolutive' 
interpretation.
Similarly, in the Inze case, where the complaint of
discrimination was raised with respect to the precedence given to 
the younger 'legitimate' son over the older 'illegitimate' son in 
attributing hereditary tarms on intestacy, the court emphasised
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the need for 'evolutive' interpretation, refusing to recognise the 
national authorities any margin of appreciation:
'... the Convention is a living instrument, to be interpreted in the 
light of present-day conditions . . . The question of equality between 
children born in and children born out of wedlock as regards their civil 
rights is today given importance in the member States of the Council of 
Europe. . . Very weighty reasons would accordingly have to be advanced 
before a difference on the ground of birth out of wedlock could be 
regarded as compatible with the Convention.' (para. 41)
On the basis of evolutive interpretation, the court rejected the 
respondent state's submission that:
'... the birth criterion reflected the convictions of the rural population 
and the social and economic condition of farmers', (para. 42)
and found a violation of art. 14 taken together with art. 1 of the 
First Protocol.
Differences in treatment on the ground ot military rank in 
disciplinary spheres may need to be reformed in accordance with 
the development towards equality, which is taking place even in 
this area. In Engel S^Ors v Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, 
A22, the court recognised that:
'... the respective legislation of a number of Contracting States seems 
to be evolving, albeit in various degrees towards greater equality in the 
disciplinary sphere between officers, non-commissioned officers and 
ordinary senicemen'. (para. 72)
It did not, however, find the difference in treatment in the 
disciplinary sphere to be discriminatory on the basis that such 
inequality was traditionally recognised by the law of the member 
states and by international humanitarian law. The national 
authorities were allowed 'a considerable margin of appreciation' 
in this respect. One may wonder whether the social 
developments that took place since the Engel judgment would 
now lead the Strasbourg organs to adopt an 'evolutive' 
interpretation as regards difterential treatment on the basis of 
rank in disciplinary offences.
Burden of proof
A stringent policy of review with respect to differences in 
treatment on the ground of race, sex or illegitimacy may also be 
revealed by the onus imposed on the national authorities to prove 
the necessity of a measure. As regards differences on the ground 
of sex, the Strasbourg organs have consistently emphasised that:
'... the advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal 
in the Member States of the Council of Europe. This means that very 
weighty reasons would have to be advanced before a difference of 
treatment on the ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with the 
Convention. (Abdulaziz &^0rs v UK, para. 78)
The tendency to shift the onus of proof may also be seen in 
relation to discrimination on the ground of illegitimacy. In the
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Inze case, the court emphasised the emerging European 
consensus towards the elimination of discrimination against 
'illegitimate' children, and hence the need for evolutiveo '
interpretation. It pointed out that:
'... very weighty reasons would accordingly have to be advanced before 
a difference of treatment on the ground of birth out of wedlock could be 
regarded as compatible with the Convention', (para. 41)
Such a heavy burden of proof may also be placed on the 
national authorities in case of discrimination on the ground of
national origin (Gaygusuz v Austria, para. 42).
CONCLUSION
The criteria established by the Strasbourg organs may be 
summarised as follows. First, an individual or a group 
complaining of discrimination must be placed in a situation 
comparable or analogous to that of other groups who are better 
treated. Second, a difference in treatment constitutes 
discrimination if there is no legitimate aim and no reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and 
the aim sought. Third, the national authorities are allowed a 
certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what 
extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a 
different treatment in law.
The scope of the margin of appreciation depends on the 
circumstances, the subject-matter and its background, as well as 
the existence or non-existence of European consensus. 
Macdonald notes that in assessing the margin of appreciation in 
the context of art. 14, the court engages in a 'particularly detailed' 
analysis of the factual background of the case (Macdonald, p. 
119). The existence of consensus among the member states is 
likely to justify strict scrutiny, which may include close attention 
to the effects of the interference and reliance on evolutive 
interpretation. Moreover, the language adopted in the case-law of 
art. 14 suggests that the scope of any margin left to national 
authorities in respect of differences on the ground of race, sex and 
illegitimacy has been reduced to almost nothing.
As regards review in the context of discrimination, a survey of 
the case-law reveals the application of a dual standard. Where 
differences in treatment are based on the ground of race, sex or 
illegitimacy, the suspicion that the national authorities have 
overstepped the margin of discretion is unallayed. The tendency 
is to carry out a separate examination of the merits under art. 14 
and a substantive provision even though a breach of the latter 
provision is already established. In these areas, another tendency 
is to apply a heightened standard of proportionality. This may be 
seen in the reliance on the affirmative methods of interpretation, 
such as evolutive interpretation and comparative method, as well 
as in the shifting of the onus of proof to a respondent state. On 
the other hand, differences of treatment on other grounds have 
yet to invite the same degree of stringent scrutiny under art. 14. 
The Strasbourg organs tend to be satisfied with the finding of a 
violation of a substantive right, and they do not consider it 
necessary to carry out a separate examination under the heading 
of art. 14. In these areas, reliance on the affirmative methods of 
interpretation is lacking as well.
The change in the social attitudes may render untenable the 
grounds of distinction which have so far been regarded as 
inoffensive to the Convention's values. It is thus important that 
the Strasbourg organs should not apply any categorical 
distinction between what they regard as 'suspect' categories and 
those which are not. It is desirable that every time they feel the 
need to draw such a line, they should always articulate the 
underlying reasons for doing so. @
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